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Rejection of Nonresidential Leases of
Real Property in Bankruptcy: What
Happens to the Mortgagee's
Security Interest?
William E. Winfield*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most powerful tools accorded to debtors in possession or
to trustees in bankruptcy is the power to assume or reject executory
contracts or unexpired leases. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code,'
which carries over similar provisions from the former Bankruptcy
Act,2 gives debtors in possession, or the debtor's trustee, the power to
"assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor."3
In 1984, Congress substantially rewrote section 365. The major fo-
cus of these changes was to address dissatisfaction with the fact that
unexpired leases, primarily in shopping centers, remained unresolved
for long periods of time.4 Congress partly addressed these concerns
* Partner, Nordman, Cormany, Hair & Compton, Oxnard, California; B.A., Brig-
ham Young University, 1982; J.D., University of Utah, 1985. The author wishes to ex-
press his gratitude to Carl F. Morey for his valuable research and editorial assistance,
and to Nancy Sermay for her proofreading assistance.
Some of the research used for this article was done in connection with representa-
tion of a secured creditor with a security interest in a rejected lease. However, the au-
thor has not been compensated for the preparation of this article. The views reflected
herein are those of the author alone and are not necessarily the views of Nordman,
Cormany, Hair & Compton. Nordman, Cormany, Hair & Compton and the author
have represented parties on various sides of the issues discussed herein. See Douglas,
Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227, 232 (1965).
1. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
2. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988); see Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. CHi. L. REV. 467, 468 (1964) (noting that "[tihe
power of rejection is a valuable weapon ... in the armory of the trustee"); see also In
re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 58 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
4. See R. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 9.05[1], at 9-64.4 (1989).
by creating a new category of leases-the nonresidential real prop-
erty leaseS--and imposing a sixty-day deadline for assuming or re-
jecting nonresidential real property leases.6 Failure to expressly
assume or reject within sixty days results in automatic "rejection" of
the lease.7
Although the Code,8 the Act,9 and many commentators 10 describe
the effect of "rejection" as a breach, case law has not uniformly
adopted this description as a definition." As one commentator
pointed out, courts have described the power to reject as a release,12
repeal,13 reconsideration,14 discharge,15 revocation,16 repudiation,17
alteration,18 voiding,19 cancellation, 20 or avoidance. 21
Indeed, while substantial case law and commentary have been
dedicated to (1) the time and procedure for rejecting or assuming
leases,22 (2) which leases can be assumed,23 and (3) the respective
rights of lessors and lessees,24 relatively little has been written on the
5. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (1988).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. § 502(g) (1988).
9. In 1938, the Chandler Act amended the Bankruptcy Act, adding sections 70b
and 63c. Section 63c provided: "Notwithstanding any State law to the contrary, the re-
jection of an executory contract or unexpired lease, as provided in this Act, shall con-
stitute a breach of such contract or lease as of the date of filing of the petition."
Epstein, Executory Contracts in Leases, in ALI-ABA, THE WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE
ON BANKRUPTCY: CRITIQUE OF THE FIRST DECADE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND
AGENDA FOR REFORM 74-75 (1988).
10. See, e.g., G. TREISTER, J. TROST, L. FORMAN, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW § 5.04(f), at 251-53 (2d ed. 1988).
11. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 80-81.
12. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59
U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 847 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513,
528 (1984)).
13. Id. (citing In re Stable Mews Assocs., 41 Bankr. 594, 596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984)).
14. Id. (citing In re Cleve, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1217, 1220 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1977)).
15. Id. (citing In re KMMCO, Inc., 40 Bankr. 976, 977 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
16. Id. (citing KMMCO, Inc., 40 Bankr. at 978)).
17. Id. (citing In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 604 F.2d 1002, 1003-04 (7th
Cir. 1979)).
18. Id. (citing In re TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp., 79 Bankr. 663, 666 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1987)).
19. Id. (citing In re Silver, 26 Bankr. 526, 530 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that
"any executory contract to which a debtor in bankruptcy is a party is a voidable con-
tract by virtue of section 365(a) .... ")).
20. Id. (citing In re Allain, 59 Bankr. 107, 108 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986)).
21. Id. (citing In re Cherry, 78 Bankr. 65, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)).
22. See, e.g., Assumption of Nonresidential Real Property Leases: Section
365(d)(4), 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 79 (1987).
23. See, e.g., Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases: Section 365, 3 BANKR.
DEV. J. 217 (1986).
24. See, e.g., Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases: Right to Adequate Protec-
tion Prior to Assumption or Rejection, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 421 (1987).
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effect of lease rejection on the interests of leasehold mortgagees.
This issue frequently arises in commercial leases in which the lessor
or lessee (or both) grants a security interest in its interest in the
lease to a lender or mortgagee, and one of the parties to the lease
(i.e., the lessor or lessee) files bankruptcy and rejects the lease.
Four general factual situations exist in which lease rejection under
section 365 could affect a mortgagee's security interest: (1) rejection
by a lessor where the lessor has granted a security interest in the
lease; (2) rejection by a lessor where the lessee has granted a security
interest in the lease; (3) rejection by a lessee where the lessee has
granted a security interest in the lease; and (4) rejection by a lessee
where the lessor has granted a security interest in the lease.
An interpretation that rejection is a "termination" could wipe out
the security of a lender-creditor, while an interpretation that rejec-
tion is a "breach" could accelerate the debt, leaving the security in-
tact. The Bankruptcy Code has built-in protections for lessees and
lessors of rejected leases,25 but no statutory provision presently pro-
tects secured creditors. The few published cases addressing the effect
of lease rejection on mortgagees are deeply divided.26 This article
will analyze cases dealing with the effect of lease rejection on mort-
gagees under section 365, discuss drafting considerations to protect a
mortgagee's interest from the perils of rejection, and suggest a reso-
lution to the conflicting case law on the subject.
II. EFFECT OF LEASE REJECTION UNDER SECTION 365 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, with some
specific exceptions, "the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor."2 7 Section 365(d)(4) provides that when the debtor is the
lessee, the trustee (or the debtor in possession) must assume or reject
an unexpired lease of nonresidential real property within sixty days
after the date of the petition's filing or the "lease is deemed rejected,
and the trustee shall immediately surrender such nonresidential real
property to the lessor."28 Sections 365(g) and 502(g) state that the re-
jection is to be treated as a prepetition breach. 29
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d), (g), (h) (1988).
26. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 80-81; see also infra notes 194-95.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
28. Id. § 365(d)(4).
29. See id. §§ 365(g), 502(g).
The literal language of section 365(h), on the other hand, provides
that a lessee may treat a lease rejected by a lessor-debtor as termi-
nated "where the disaffirmance by the trustee amounts to such a
breach as would entitle the lessee ... to treat such lease ... as termi-
nated by virtue of its own terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or
other agreements the lessee ... has made with other parties . "..."30
Section 365(h) also provides that a lessee under a lease rejected by a
lessor-debtor alternatively "may remain in possession of the lease-
hold ... for the balance of such term and for any renewal or exten-
sion of such term that is enforceable by such lease . . . under
nonbankruptcy law."31 The language of all these sections could pro-
vide the basis for arguing that rejection is tantamount to either a
breach or termination.
In Bank of Matin v. England,32 Justice Douglas noted that literal
application of section 70 of the former Bankruptcy Act-the prede-
cessor of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code-could compel inconsis-
tent and inequitable results. Holding that the terms of the statute
did not compel such a result, Justice Douglas stated for the Court:
"Yet we do not read these statutory words with the ease of a com-
puter. There is an overriding consideration that equitable principles
govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction." 33 Section 365 of the
new Bankruptcy Code is sufficiently complex that consideration of
congressional intent is warranted to avoid inequitable and inconsis-
tent conclusions based upon a narrow examination of the statute's
language.34 Also, when considering cases on the effect of lease rejec-
tion, it is important to note the context of each case and the equitable
principles affecting the decision.
A recent article on executory contracts offers valuable insight into
the meaning of rejection.3 5 Rejection of a contract in bankruptcy is
not a "revocation or repudiation or cancellation," but "simply a bank-
ruptcy estate's decision not to assume, because the contract or lease
does not represent a favorable or appropriate investment of the es-
tate's resources." 36 Thus, the substantive rights of the parties to the
contract or lease are not changed. Rejection means only that the
bankruptcy estate will not become a party to the contract or lease,37
and it "leaves the non-debtor in the same position as all others who
30. Id. § 365(h)(1).
31. Id.
32. 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
33. Id. at 103.
34. See In re Upland/Euclid, Ltd., 56 Bankr. 250, 259 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1985)
(Volinn, J., dissenting).
35. Andrew, supra note 12.
36. Id. at 848.
37. Id.
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have dealt with the debtor ".... 38 The debtor is presumed to have
"breached," providing the basis for a claim.39 This understanding
would obviate much litigation over the respective rights of parties
and would help reconcile the apparent conflict found in cases inter-
preting the effect of rejection.
III. EFFECT OF LEASE REJECTION BY THE LESSOR-DEBTOR
Numerous bankruptcy court decisions and commentaries discuss
the effect of rejection of a lease by a lessor-debtor under section 365
of the Bankruptcy Code.40 Most of these decisions deal with the im-
pact of rejection on the innocent lessee.
A debtor assuming or rejecting a lease must assume or reject the
entire lease. The debtor may not modify the lease or assume in part
and reject in part.41 It is well established that rejection of a lease by
a lessor-debtor under section 365 does not affect the lessee's interest
in the lease.42 Under section 365(h)(1), a lessee can choose to treat a
lease rejected by a lessor-debtor as terminated, or the lessee may re-
main in possession for the term of the lease and any renewals or ex-
tensions available under the terms of the lease.43 In either case, the
lessee can seek damages for breach of the lease resulting from rejec-
38. Id. at 931.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., In re LHD Realty Corp., 20 Bankr. 717, 719 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982)
(holding that rejection by the lessor-debtor did not terminate the lease so as to divest
the lessee of his estate in the property); Epstein, supra note 9.
41. See In re TSW Stores of Nanuet, 34 Bankr. 299, 304 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). In
TSW Stores, the court noted that the trustee or debtor in possession must take a con-
tract cum onere, or subject to all terms and conditions. Id. (citing Thompson v. Texas
Mexican Ry. Co., 328 U.S. 134, 141 (1946)).
42. See In re Upland/Euclid, Ltd., 56 Bankr. 250, 252 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1985) (noting
that where lessor-debtor rejects a real property lease and lessee chooses to remain in
possession, the debtor may stop the flow of funds and services, but the debtor cannot
take away the lessee's possessory interest in the leased property and the debtor has no
right to alter the rent stated in the lease); In re Stable Mews Assocs., 35 Bankr. 603,
605 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a landlord-debtor cannot reject a lease for
sole purpose of increasing rent to existing tenants, and that rent owed by tenant to
landlord-debtor should remain as stated in the lease); LHD Realty, 20 Bankr. at 719
(holding that congressional intent was to "afford the debtor the benefit of rejecting an
undesirable lease while at the same time protecting the property rights of the lessee"
and that rejection does not divest the lessee of its interest in the property); In re 1438
Meridian Place, N.W., Inc., 11 Bankr. 352, 352-53 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981) (holding that
rejection of the lease by the lessor-debtor in possession extinguished the lessor's obli-
gation but did not bind lessees to surrender possession, and that a lessee's substantive
rights of possession could not be determined without a plenary hearing on the issues).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (1988).
tion. The import of these cases is that rejection of a lease by a lessor-
debtor under section 365 does not result in the eviction of the lessee.
Courts also have held that rejection of a lease by a lessor-debtor
under section 365 merely places the lessee in a position to seek state
law remedies.44 The argument can be made that, just as summary re-
jection of the lease under section 365 does not affect a lessee's posses-
sory interest in the leasehold, rejection of a lease under section 365
does not diminish the rights of secured parties. A secured party re-
tains rights under the rejected contract,4 5 and rejection of a lease
under section 365 does not cancel contractual obligations between the
parties.46 In the absence of enforceable contractual provisions to the
contrary, a lessee-nondebtor still would have the option under sec-
tion 365(h)(2) to treat the lease as terminated, which could eliminate
the secured party's rights in the lease.
If a lessor's rejection of a lease does not destroy the property inter-
est of a lessee in the leasehold unless the lessee elects to terminate, a
question arises as to whether the rejection of a lease by a lessor-
debtor should destroy the security interest of a creditor in the lease-
hold. Commentators interpreting section 365 have argued that the
rejection of a lease under section 365 and the concomitant balancing
between a lessor-debtor's rights and a tenant's rights "should not
frustrate the reasonable commercial expectations of the mortgagee
.... [T]he most cogent legal reasoning and venerable principles of
equity vindicate the mortgagee's priority. .... 47
Two scenarios should be considered to highlight the potential ineq-
uity that can inure to mortgagees from a mechanical ieading of sec-
tion 365; they involve the lessee's mortgagee and the lessor-debtor's
mortgagee. There are no cases on point dealing with the rights of
either the lessee's mortgagee or the lessor-debtor's mortgagee. In
either case, the lessee, not the lessor-debtor, owes a debt to the
lessee's mortgagee. The lessee's mortgagee can still look to the lessee
44. See In re Adams, 65 Bankr. 646, 649 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that rejec-
tion of a lease under section 365(d)(4), even if followed by a granting of relief from the
automatic stay, merely places the creditor in a position to obtain possession of the
premises under state law); see also In re Garfinkle, 577 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1978)
(noting that rejection of an unexpired lease does not preclude collection of payments
for fair rental value of use and occupancy, and that if the tenant is injured by rejection
of lease, the tenant becomes a creditor of the bankruptcy estate).
45. See In re Pendleton, 40 Bankr. 306, 311 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984) (finding that
rejection of an executory contract for sales of milk by the debtor in possession did not
abrogate the secured creditor's assigned right in proceeds from milk sales).
46. See In re Schnabel, 612 F.2d 315, 317 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that a tenant is
still obligated to pay fair rental value of use and occupancy of leased premises); see also
LHD Realty, 20 Bankr. at 719 (noting that rejection of a lease simply cancels the cove-
nants requiring the debtor's future performance).
47. Alces, Unexpired Leases in Bankruptcy: Rights of the Affected Mortgagee, 35
U. FLA. L. REV. 656, 681 (1983).
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for payment of its debt and for additional security. The lessee's mort-
gagee also may have contract rights48 from its loan agreement which
may allow the mortgagee some input in, or control of, the lessee's
election to treat the lease as terminated or to remain in possession.
In addition, the lessee's mortgagee may have a contract right to take
possession of the leasehold and gain an interest in the damage claim
against the lessor-debtor for breach of the lease.
If the lessee does not elect to treat the lease as terminated, the
lessee's mortgagee's security interest in the lease should continue. It
would be inequitable to allow the lessor-debtor to convert the lessee's
mortgagee's secured claim into an unsecured claim by rejection of the
lease.
The lessor-debtor's mortgagee's position also depends on whether
the lessee elects to treat the lease as terminated or to remain in pos-
session. Although there are no cases on point, the lessor-debtor's
mortgagee's security interest in the lease might be considered the
same as the lessee's right to possession, and thus might survive the
rejection by the lessor-debtor.
Under this scenario, if the lessor-debtor rejected the lease and the
lessee elected to treat the lease as terminated, the lessor's mortga-
gee's security interest in the lease would be extinguished. If the
lessee elected to remain in possession, the lessor-debtor's mortgagee
would have a security interest in the rents if the lease survived rejec-
tion by the lessor-debtor. It is not clear whether the lessor-debtor's
mortgagee would have any priority regarding the rents if the court
determined that the lease and, thus, its security interest were extin-
guished by the rejection. It also would 'be inequitable to allow the
lessor-debtor to convert the lessor-debtor's mortgagee's secured claim
into an unsecured claim by rejection of the lease when the lessee
elects to remain in possession and does not treat the lease as
terminated.,
IV. EFFECT OF LEASE REJECTION BY THE LESSEE-DEBTOR
In the case of lease rejection by a lessee-debtor, one must consider
the rights of the lessor, the lessor's mortgagee secured by the lease,
and the lessee-debtor's mortgagee. Although no published cases pres-
ently exist dealing with the rights of the lessor's mortgagee, the les-
sor's mortgagee may have a security interest in the lessor's claim
against the lessee-debtor if the lessor's mortgagee's contract so pro-
48. See infra notes 72-99 and accompanying text,
vides.49 The rights of the lessor and the lessee-debtor's mortgagee
are discussed in the following cases.
A. Garfinkle
The first reported case interpreting the effect of lease rejection by
a lessee-debtor on the rights of mortgagees was a case interpreting
section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act-the predecessor to section 365 of
the Bankruptcy Code.50 In In re Garfinkle,51 the court expressly
considered the effect of lease rejection by a lessee-debtor and a les-
sor-debtor on the rights of the lessee-debtor's mortgagee. The trustee
was a "split-personality" trustee in that the debtor was both the les-
sor and lessee under the subject lease and had a debt secured by the
lessee's interest in the lease.52 The court noted that the authorities
agree that "rejection by the trustee of a bankrupt lessee, does not in
and of itself terminate the lease."53
The Garfinkle court held that the same rule applies to protect the
rights of mortgagees. The court "agree[d] that the Trustee's rejection
of the lease for Barbara Garfinkle, lessee, did not destroy the lease-
hold estate. That action merely placed the leasehold outside the bank-
ruptcy administration without destroying the underlying estate and,
therefore, the mortgage of Morris Landsburgh [lessee's mortga-
gee]."54 Subsequent cases have adopted this language,55 as well as
the equitable approach of Garfinkle.56
The Garfinkle court further stated that "[p]roperly used, the terms
assumption and rejection refer to the bankruptcy trustee's decision to
administer or refuse to administer assets of the bankrupt."57 The
same rationale could logically pertain to application of section 365 in
the case of mortgagees.
In Garfinkle, the trustee acting for the lessor-debtor also at-
tempted to terminate the lease through the exercise of a default
clause.58 The court considered the mortgagee's argument that it was
inequitable to allow the trustee acting for the lessor-debtor to take
49. See id for a discussion of contract drafting considerations.
50. See supra note 9.
51. 577 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978).
52. Id. at 903.
53. Id. at 904.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., In re Delta Motor Hotel of Syracuse, 10 Bankr. 585, 601 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1981) (applied equitable principles for the benefit of creditors and the public
interest).
56. See, e.g., In re Curio Shoppes, Inc., 55 Bankr. 148, 153-55 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1985) (holding that resort to equity was proper to prevent forfeiture of lease when lit-
eral enforcement of statute would frustrate purposes of reorganization); see also Ep-
stein, supra note 9, at 81 (discussing cases that follow and decline to follow Garfinkle).
57. Garfinkle, 577 F.2d at 905.
58. Id. at 904.
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advantage of a situation created by the lessee-debtor.5 9 The court
also considered the counterargument that the mortgagee should not
be placed in a better position just "because the lessor and lessee
[were] the same person."60
The court observed that the mortgagee had the opportunity to pro-
tect himself by including a "pick-up lease" clause in the lease agree-
ment.61 As the Garfinkle court noted, creditors of the bankruptcy
estate usually are better served by the continued existence of a lease-
hold mortgage, especially if the lessee's mortgagee is willing to con-
tribute money to the bankruptcy estate as he does by picking up the
lease.62 The court stated that "[i]n a bankruptcy context the justifica-
tion for the continued existence of the leasehold mortgage is stronger
if the mortgagee is willing to 'put something in the pot' for the rest of
the creditors."63
Since resolution of the issue regarding exercise of the default
clause in Garfinkle involved a factual determination concerning the
equities, the case was remanded for further proceedings.6 4
B. Hawaii Dimensions
One of the first Code cases to squarely address the issue of the ef-
fect of lease rejection by a lessee-debtor on mortgagees was In re Ha-
waii Dimensions.65  Although its analysis is sparse, Hawaii
Dimensions specifically addresses the effect of lease rejection by a
lessee-debtor.
Hawaii Dimensions involved a Chapter 11 lessee-debtor who re-
jected a commercial lease a few days before closing its doors and con-
verting to Chapter 7. The lessee-debtor owed $100,000 in rent to the
lessor. The debtor also owed a debt secured by the lease to Commer-
cial Finance, Ltd., a debtor in a separate Chapter 11 proceeding.
Commercial Finance opposed the court's order allowing rejection of
the lease.66 Bankruptcy Judge Jon J. Chinen was left to decide, in
essence, who would receive the security-the landlord or the secured
creditor. Judge Chinen noted that "Commercial [the lessee's mortga-
59. Id.
60. Id. at 905.
61. Id
62. Id. at 905-06.
63. Id. at 906.
64. Id.
65. 39 Bankr. 606 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984), aff'd, 47 Bankr. 425 (D. Haw. 1985).
66. Id. at 606-07.
gee] had protective measures available to it by way of the mortgage
protection clause in its lease, which it did not exercise." 67 Judge
Chinen ruled in favor of the landlord, summarily concluding that:
Where the debtor-lessee in possession rejects the lease, it is clear that the
debtor no longer desires to remain in possession but rather desires the cancel-
lation or termination of the lease. The "protection" then afforded the other
party to the lease, the nondebtor lessor, as stated in § 502(b)(7) is to claim
"damages resulting from the termination of a lease of real property ......
The interrelationship of § 365(h) and § 502(b)(7), the former referring to re-
jection and the latter to termination, further reveal the intent of Congress
that the effect of a debtor lessee's rejection is the termination of the landlord-
tenant relationship. The fact that Congress did not include a statutory provi-
sion to the contrary is further support for the proposition that rejection of a
lease constitutes termination.
Although courts have dealt with various aspects of rejection of a lease, few,
if any have discussed the effect. Those which have, are in accord that rejec-
tion constitutes termination. In In re O.P.M. Leasing Services,- Ltd.,....
although the court was dealing with a setoff issue, the court clearly treated
the rejection as termination of the lease.6 8
The "interrelationship of § 365(h) and § 502(b)" does not support
Judge Chinen's conclusion for two reasons. First, section 365(h),
which allows a rejected lease to be treated as terminated, does not
apply to the facts of Hawaii Dimensions because it applies only to
lessor-debtors, and Hawaii Dimensions did not involve a lessor-
debtor. Second, even if Hawaii Dimensions did involve a lessor-
debtor, Judge Chinen's conclusion conflicts with both the legislative
history for the 1984 amendment to section 365, which suggests that a
mortgagee's interest is not terminated,69 and the pre-Code case law
that protects mortgagees even in the absence of mortgage protection
clauses.70
The In re O.P.M. Leasing Services71 case cited in Hawaii Dimen-
sions did not involve the rights of a mortgagee. Rather, O.P.M. Leas-
ing dealt with the issue of setoffs and concluded that post-petition
rent for a lease rejected under section 365 could not be set off against
another post-petition obligation because a lease rejection under sec-
tion 365 is deemed terminated immediately prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.7 2 "A close reading of O.P.M Leasing ... indi-
cates that Judge Lifland was referring to the damage claims arising
from the deemed breach of lease under [section] 365(g)(1) and not
the actual termination of the lease."73
Commercial Finance, the lessee-debtor's mortgagee, appealed the
67. Id. at 608.
68. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
69. See infra note 180.
70. See supra note 51 and infra note 181.
71. 30 Bankr. 642 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
72. Id. at 650-51.
73. In re Storage Technology Corp., 53 Bankr. 471, 474 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
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trial court's decision in Hawaii Dimensions.7 4 On appeal, the district
court upheld the bankruptcy court's decision.75 District Court Judge
Samuel King compared the effect of lease rejection by a lessee to
lease rejection by a lessor, in which the lessee has the option to re-
main in possession, and concluded that the result of rejection is ter-
mination of the lease.76 Juidge King did not consider the underlying
legal rationale for preserving the lessee's possessory interests, as dis-
cussed in Ir re 1438 Meridian Place, N. W., Inc.7 7
Judge KinC distinguished Garfinkle because it was an Act case,
and because it was a case in which the only effect of rejection was
termination of t:ie mortgage-as opposed to providing a benefit to the
estate and allowing a lessor to regain possession.78 It is significant
that the district court's decision to uphold Hawaii Dimensions was
apparently based in part on equitable considerations.
C. Southwest Aircraft
A subsequent case sometimes cited7 9 for the proposition that rejec-
tion terminates the lease is the opinion by Judge Russell in In re
Southwest Aircraft Services,80 even though it did not involve or ad-
dress the issue of a secured creditor's interest in the leasehold. In
Southwest Aircraft, the lessee-debtor filed a motion to extend the
time to assume or reject a lease under section 365(d)(4). The issue
was whether section 365 permits the court to extend the time for a
debtor in possession to assume or reject a lease under section
365(d)(4), where the motion was filed within sixty days but not heard
until after sixty days. Judge Russell ruled that a hearing and deci-
sion must occur within sixty days or the lease will be deemed
rejected.S1
The debtor filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that rejec-
tion of the lease resulted in an abandonment of property to the
debtor, rather than a termination of the lease. Judge Russell re-
jected this argument and ruled that "it is clear Congress intended
74. In re Hawaii Dimensions, 47 Bankr. 425 (D. Haw. 1985).
75. Id. at 428.
76. Id at 427-28.
77. 11 Bankr. 352 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981).
78. Hawaii Dimensions, 47 Bankr. at 428.
79. See In re Bernard, 69 Bankr. 13, 15 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986).
80. 53 Bankr. 805 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 66 Bankr. 121 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1986), rev'd, 831 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1987).
81. Id. at 809.
that rejecting a lease terminates the lease."8 2 In support of this rul-
ing, Judge Russell referred to just two cases-Hawaii Dimensions
and In re Mead.83
Southwest Aircraft did not address the impact of lease rejections
on holders of a security interest, nor did it consider the Garfinkle de-
cision. The totality of Southwest Aircraft's analysis of lease rejection
is contained in the above-quoted sentence and its citation of the two
supporting cases.8 4 In re Mead85 did not involve the impact of lease
rejection on a security interest. In fact, Mead does not analyze the
issue of termination of a lease, as opposed to rejection, and does not
even consider the effect of a lease rejection. The case merely states:
"The court must deem the lease rejected and terminated by opera-
tion of law. Tle landlord's application for termination of the lease
will be granted."86
After the trial court decision in Southwest Aircraft, the debtors ap-
pealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit,
which upheld Judge Russell's ruling that (1) the decision regarding
acceptance or rejection of the lease must be made within the sixty-
day time limit, and (2) rejection of a lease under section 365(d)(4) re-
sults in termination of a lease.87 Without analysis or citations, the
panel summarily concluded: "To us, 'rejection' normally implies ter-
mination of the debtor's interest. The statute is even more explicit
here, however, because it adds that if the lease is deemed rejected
'the trustee shall immediately surrender such nonresidential real
property to the lessor.' s88
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's decision was overruled by the
Ninth Circuit, which held that (1) the bankruptcy court retained au-
thority to consider a debtor's motion even though the sixty-day pe-
riod had expired, and (2) the debtor's failure to make proper rental
payments during the sixty-day period did not require the bankruptcy
court to deem the lease rejected.8 9 Because. the Ninth Circuit did not
consider the effect of a lease rejection under section 365, Southwest
Aircraft has come to stand, in part, for the proposition that rejection
of a lease is tantamount to termination, even though the holdings on
the issue are dicta.
82. Id. at 810.
83. Id.
84. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
85. 28 Bankr. 1000 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
86. Id. at 1002.
87. In re Southwest Aircraft Services, 66 Bankr. 121, 123 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986),
rev'd. 831 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1987).
88. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (Supp. IV 1986)).
89. In re Southwest Aircraft Services, 831 F.2d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 1987).
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D. Storage Technology
The Hawaii Dimensions case was questioned in In re Storage Tech-
nology Corp.90 Sobrato Development Companies (Sobrato) was the
lessor-owner of commercial real property located in California. Stor-
age Technology Corporation (STC) was the debtor and lessee under a
master lease with Sobrato. STC subleased to National Semiconductor
Corporation (NSC). STC subsequently filed for bankruptcy. STC
and Sobrato made a formal settlement agreement, which was ap-
proved by the court after notice to all creditors, providing that STC
would assume the subleases with NSC and assign them to Sobrato,
and then reject the master lease leaving NSC in direct contractual
privity with Sobrato. In exchange, Sobrato agreed to reduce its claim
against STC.91
NSC filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that (1) rejec-
tion of the master lease terminated the subleases; (2) rejection of the
master lease would create a merger terminating the subleases under
California law; and (3) the settlement between STC and SDC was
"an improper partial assumption and partial rejection of the master
lease."92
The court determined that the threshold issue was the effect of re-
jection of the master lease as contemplated by the original settle-
ment. After a thorough analysis of Hawaii Dimensions, O.P.M.
Leasing, and Garfinkle, the court followed the Garfinkle decision
and stated: "[T]he apparently conflicting cases regarding the effect of
rejection of a lease can be reconciled with one word: equity. In both
Garfinkle and Hawaii Dimensions, the potential for inequitable re-
sults appears to have a large impact on the ultimate result
reached."93
The Storage Technology court went on to hold that a legal distinc-
tion exists between the terms "breach" and "termination":
Under the law of the [S]tate of California, and virtually every other state, a
breach of a real property lease is not synonymous with termination of the
lease....
The drafters of § 365 apparently knew the difference between breach and
termination. Where the legal concept of termination is appropriate that term
is used....
A review of the overall structure of § 365 also indicates that the words
"breach" and "termination" were intended to have different meanings. Under
90. 53 Bankr. 471 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
91. Id. at 472.
92. Id. at 473.
93. Id. at 474.
subsection (a) the trustee, subject to court approval, may reject any lease or
executory contract. The trustee's unqualified right to reject leases and execu-
tory contracts is limited by subsections (h) and (i) which limit the trustee's
right to terminate all such leases or contracts. 9 4
The Storage Technology court also noted that the authors of Collier
on Bankruptcy recognized the same distinction when stating:
The touchstone of a claim under the 1978 legislation is termination of a lease
of real property rather than claims for anticipatory breach of contracts, dam-
ages for injury resulting from rejections, or damages under a covenant contin-
ued in such lease. Whether, in fact, a lease has terminated is a matter to be
determined by the court, for not all events result in termination within the
meaning of section 502(b)(6). 9 5
In light of the foregoing, the court in Storage Technology concluded
"that rejection of a lease does not have the conclusive effect of termi-
nating the lease. At a minimum, a nondebtor lessor has the option' of
treating a lease which has been rejected as not having been
terminated."96
E. Picnic 'N Chicken
The next case to deal with this issue was In re Picnic 'N Chicken.97
In Picnic 'N Chicken, the lessee-debtor rejected a commercial lease.
The debtor was the fee owner of the land and the lessee of the build-
ing and improvements on the land. The debtor had sold the buildings
and improvements to Blue Barn Associates and had leased them back
as part of a sale/leaseback arrangement. The purchaser did not lease
the land from the debtor, but the lease for the building and improve-
ments provided that in the event of a default by the debtor, the
debtor would lease the land to the purchaser on a triple-net basis for
the unexpired term of the building lease. The debtor rejected the
building lease, arguing that it was no longer bound to lease the land
to the owner of the building as the lease was terminated by its rejec-
tion. Blue Barn argued that rejection did not relieve the debtor from
its obligation to lease the land to it, that the sale/leaseback transac-
tion was really a loan/security transaction, and that it should have an
equitable lien on the land.98 Bankruptcy Judge Louise DeCarl
Malugen held that:
(A] rejection under § 365(g) is a breach of lease. California law provides
that a breach of a lease is not synonymous with the termination of that lease.
Where a California lease so provides, California Civil Code § 1951.4 permits a
lessor to treat the lease as continuing in effect even though its lessee has
breached the lease and abandoned the property. Therefore, under California
law there is clearly a distinction drawn between a breach of the lease and the
termination of it.
94. Id. at 474-75 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 475 (quoting COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 502.02, at 502-60 (15th ed. 1984)).
96. Id.
97. 58 Bankr. 523 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986).
98. Id. at 524-25.
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Likewise, it appears that the drafters of § 365 were aware of the difference
between a "breach" and a "termination." For example, in § 365(h)(1) and
(i)(1), although the trustee has a right to reject lease and executory contracts,
the lessees, time share interest purchasers and real property purchasers in
possession are accorded the option of treating the rejected agreements as ter-
minated or remaining in possession. Therefore, at least with respect to those
sections, it is clear that the drafters were aware that a rejection of a lease or
executory contract did not result necessarily in the termination of that
agreement. 99
Judge Malugen noted the paucity of cases on the issue and stated
that "the better-reasoned decisions hold that rejection by the debtor
does not necessarily terminate a lease agreement for all purposes." 100
Judge Malugen further noted that "[a]lthough the [c]ourt's decision
[in Garfinkle] was one construing the effect of rejection under
§ 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act... it does not appear that the [c]ourt's
analysis would have been significantly different under the present
§ 365."101
After considering the Hawaii Dimensions case, Judge Malugen
adopted the ruling of Storage Technology, which reconciled the oppo-
site conclusions of Hawaii Dimensions and Garfinkle by resort to eq-
uity.102 Judge Malugen held that rejection of the lease for the
building did not terminate it and the clause requiring the debtor to
lease the land to the building owner was enforceable. 0 3 Judge
Malugen also concluded that the sale/leaseback agreement was a dis-
guised financing agreement and that the lessor was a secured creditor
and should be treated as such.104
Two subsequent cases, Societe Nationale Algerienne Pour La
Recherche v. Distrigas Corp.10 5 and in In re Blackburn,O6 have fol-
lowed the reasoning in Picnic 'N Chicken.
F. Bernard
In 1986, Judge Chinen again addressed the effect of lease rejection.
99. Id. at 525-26 (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 526 (citing In re Garfinkle, 577 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978)).
101. Id.
102. Id.; see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
103. Picnic 'N Chicken, 58 Bankr. at 526, 530.
104. Id. at 527, 530.
105. 80 Bankr. 606, 608-09 (D. Mass. 1987) (noting that the narrow and precise con-
struction of statutory language requires adoption of the Picnic 'N Chicken and Storage
Technology position that lease rejection results in a breach rather than termination as
suggested by Hawaii Dimensions).
106. 88 Bankr. 273, 276 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that rejection of a lease
under section 365 does not result in termination of the lease).
In In re Bernard,10o Judge Chinen signed an order indicating that a
nonresidential sublease had been "rejected [by the lessee-debtor] and
terminated."108 First Interstate Bank, which had a security interest
in the lease as the lessee-debtor's creditors, and the Mortgage Bank-
ers Association of Hawaii filed a motion to amend Judge Chinen's or-
der, contending that the rights of the leasehold mortgagee and other
third parties prevented a merger and termination of the leasehold. 109
Judge Chinen rejected the arguments of the mortgage bankers and
stated:
If it is determined that a lease is still in existence and subject to the lease-
hold mortgage even after the lease is deemed rejected, the lessor will continue
to be frustrated in obtaining income from his commercial property. Unless
the mortgage is paid, the mortgagee may foreclose on its mortgage and de-
prive the new lessee of the premises. Under such circumstances, the lessor
may have difficulties finding a new tenant. This means that the lessor will be
further frustrated and the purpose of [s]ection 365(d)(4) will not be achieved.
Such result is contrary to the intent of Congress. 1 1 0
Judge Chinen then cited the language of section 365(d)(4) requiring
surrender of property to the lessor as evidence of congressional in-
tent that a rejection of a lease is synonymous with termination of the
lease.1 Judge Chinen's concern that the mortgage could make it
difficult for the lessor to find a new tenant would be appropriate only
if the leasehold mortgagee was arguing that its leasehold mortgage
should continue to exist after the lessee's obligations were extin-
guished. If the lessee's obligations were not extinguished, the lessee
or mortgagee would be required to pay the rent to the lessor and to
find a new tenant.
Judge Chinen acknowledged that the only authority then existing
to support his proposition was his own decision in Hawaii Dimen-
sions and the Southwest Aircraft case, which had cited Hawaii
Dimensions.ll2 Then, curiously, Judge Chinen held that Southwest
Aircraft, which had cited Hawaii Dimensions and Mead, had not re-
lied upon those cases in reaching this ruling, but had relied instead
upon the provision in section 365(d)(4) for immediate surrender of
the premises to the lessor upon rejection of the lease.113
Apparently recognizing the existence of logical inconsistencies and
inequities to mortgagees, Judge Chinen then suggested what the rem-
edies for mortgagees should be:
Section 554(b) is a new section and affords the protective provision for a
party in interest to protect its interest in the lease. If a mortgagee believes
107. 69 Bankr. 13 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986).
108. Id. at 13-14.
109. Id. at 14.
110. Id. at 14-15.
111. Id. at 15; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
112. Bernard, 69 Bankr. at 15.
113. Id.
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that the debtor-lessee is unable or unwilling to assume the lease, that the
lease is burdensome to the estate or that it is of inconsequential value and
benefit to the estate, then the mortgagee should immediately request that the
court order the trustee (debtor-in-possession) to abandon the leased premises.
Once the leased premises is abandoned, § 365(d)(4) is no longer applicable to
said leased premises.1 14
Judge Chinen's suggestion of abandonment of the lease under sec-
tion 554 would result in a reversion to the debtor. The secured credi-
tor then would be required to foreclose on the property. The only
difference between abandonment under section 554 as proposed by
Bernard and rejection as proposed by Storage Technology is that, pre-
sumably, a secured creditor would not need to wait sixty days before
seeking to have the lease abandoned. Adherence to this suggestion
would provide creditors with another avenue to litigate their inter-
ests during the first days of a bankruptcy. Moreover, the burden re-
quired to have a lease abandoned may be easier to meet than that
necessary for a motion for relief from stay under section 362. How-
ever, Judge Chinen's summary procedure for rejecting contracts and
terminating property interests is inconsistent with case law requiring
a plenary hearing before any taking of property rights.115
Judge Chinen's opinion in Bernard evidences a mechanical applica-
tion of the language in section 365 in order to reach an equitable re-
sult. Judge Chinen's mechanical application makes analysis of
section 365 more complicated than it should be. The confusion in ap-
plying section 365 arises not only from the fact that the term "rejec-
tion" is evocative of other unrelated concepts, such as rescission,
termination, and cancellation, but also from the confusion over just
exactly who is doing the "rejecting." In order to properly apply sec-
tion 365, one must understand that the party doing the rejecting is
not the debtor per se, but rather the debtor in possession (or trustee)
acting on behalf of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, a separate legal
entity.
G CM Systems
In July 1988, the District Court for the Middle District of Florida,
in In re CM Systems,116 upheld a bankruptcy court's decision that a
lessor's security interest in personal property collateral was not ex-
tinguished by a lessee's lease rejection. The debtor in CM Systems
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., In re 1438 Meridian Place, N.W., Inc., 11 Bankr. 352, 352-53 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 1981).
116. 87 Bankr. 707 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
leased three caterpillar off-highway trucks from the lessor. As part
of the lease transaction, the debtor granted the lessor a security in-
terest in any and all equipment "now or hereafter belonging to [the]
debtor."117 This security interest was properly perfected. Thereaf-
ter, the debtor acquired a Pettibone loader and the lessor's security
interest attached to the loader. The debtor subsequently filed bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 11 and rejected the equipment lease for the
trucks. The trustee argued that any existing security interest was ex-
tinguished when the lease was rejected. 11s The court rejected the
trustee's argument, holding that "it is clear that the rejection of a
lease does not change a lessor's status from secured to unsecured."119
Nevertheless, because the creditor's security interest was not actually
in the lease, CM Systems arguably does not provide direct support for
either the Storage Technology position or the Hawaii Dimensions
view.
H. Giles
One of the most recent published decisions on the issue of lease re-
jection and its impact on secured creditors is In re Giles Associates.120
In Giles, the debtor owned one half of an office building and leased
the other half from the City of San Antonio. National Bank of Com-
merce (NBC) had a first trust deed on the half of the building owned
by the debtor, as well as a lien on the debtor's leasehold from the
city. After the debtor filed bankruptcy, NBC tendered several rental
payments to the City which were accepted. Neither the debtor nor
NBC took any action to assume the lease between the lessee-debtor
and the City within the sixty-day period set forth by section
365(d)(4).121
The lessor, the City of San Antonio, then filed a motion to have the
lease deemed rejected. NBC (the leasehold mortgagee) opposed the
motion, arguing that rejection of the lease did not result in the termi-
nation of the leasehold in accordance with Storage Technology.122
Simply stated, the competing equities in Giles were (1) the City's de-
sire to relet the premises to another tenant, and (2) NBC's desire to
protect its interest in the secondary collateral securing its loan.
R. Glen Ayers, Jr., Chief Judge of the Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Texas, found it easy to reject the reasoning of
Storage Technology "and other similar opinions cited by the bank,"123
117. Id. at 708.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 92 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
121. Id. at 696.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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and to instead adopt the rationale, set forth in cases such as Bernard,
that automatic rejection of a lease under section 365(d)(4) terminates
the lease as to all parties, including creditors.124 According to Judge
Ayers, the issues were "really very simple and straightforward."1 25
Although Judge Ayers considered the argument in Storage Technol-
ogy that rejection of a lease under section 365(d)(4) is merely a
breach of a lease, he firmly rejected that position: "This analysis
would make some sense if the Bankruptcy Code at § 365(d)(4) and
the legislative history of that section were not so very clear." 126
Judge Ayers further stated: "[T]he statute is clear. Failure to act
results in first rejection and next in an absolute obligation to surren-
der the premises .... -127 Judge Ayers continued:
To say, as Judge Gueck [in Storage Technology], that the failure to act is
merely a "breach" is not consistent with either that statute or its history.
Why not? Because § 365(d)(4) deems that the trustee or debtor has, by failing
to act, breached the lease and that the breach is so serious that immediate sur-
render is mandatory. The breach plus the surrender obligation can only be
seen as termination of any of the trustee's or debtor's rights in the leasehold.
Otherwise, the face of the statute and its history are meaningless.
1 2 8
Judge Ayers did not discuss Picnic 'N Chicken129 or Societe Na-
tionale.13o His analysis, like the analysis in Hawaii Dimensions and
Bernard, fails to reconcile his- position with the cases that hold the
leasehold is not terminated by rejection.131
Judge Ayers next rejected the rationale of Storage Technology con-
cerning the use of the terms "breach" and "rejection," opining that
"Congress could have, and should have used consistent terms, but
Congressional inconsistency creates no presumptions. '"13 2 He further
stated that it was a "stretch" to conclude that the drafters of section
365 knew the difference between breach and termination. 133 Thus,
Judge Ayers' opinion fails to accord deference to congressional intent
which would lead one to assume, at a minimum, that the drafters
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 697.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 697-98.
129. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., In re Adams, 65 Bankr. 646, 648-49 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (refusing to
follow Southwest Aircraft); In re 1438 Meridian Place, N.W., Inc., 11 Bankr. 352, 352
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1981) (noting that "[iut is also well established that a rejection of a
lease does not in any way affect a tenant's leasehold estate").
132. Giles, 92 Bankr. at 698.
133. Id.
knew that a distinction existed between the words "breach" and
"termination."
Finally, Judge Ayers discounted the equity analysis of Storage
Technology. To him, the equity done in Storage Technology was "not
permissible" and in conflict with his understanding of the meaning of
section 365(d)(4): "Act within sixty days or loose [sic] possession."'134
Judge Ayers' opinion interprets the statute in a mechanical fashion,
like that criticized by Justice Douglas in Bank of Matin v. Eng-
land,135 without acknowledging the appropriate consideration of
equity.
I. Gillis
In another recent case from Hawaii, Judge Chinen again ruled that
rejection of a lease extinguished a security interest. In In re Gillis,136
the debtor was a lessee of commercial real property which the debtor
subleased to tenants. The debtor had encumbered the leasehold in
favor of a bank to secure repayment of two loans. The sixty-day pe-
riod to assume or reject under section 365(d)(4) passed without as-
sumption, and the court ruled that the lease was thus automatically
deemed rejected.137 The court further held (1) that the effect of re-
jection was to terminate the lease, effective on the date the debtor
filed the bankruptcy petition; 3 8 (2) that "[w]hen the lease was termi-
nated [i.e., as of the petition date], the bank's security interest was
completely extinguished since there was no remaining leasehold in-
terest to which the security interest could attach";139 and (3) that,
unlike leases under the Bankruptcy Act, a lease under the Bank-
ruptcy Code becomes part of the bankruptcy estate at the time of fil-
ing, even before assumption.140
The Gillis court also held that rents collected from tenants after
the petition was filed, but prior to the end of the sixty-day period of
section 365(d)(4), are the property of the bankruptcy estate, and that
"[t]he effective termination of [the lessee's] rights in the [1]ease as of
the date of the filing of [the] petition does not divest the bankruptcy
estate of [the lessee's] interest in the post-petition rents."14' There-
fore, the bank, which had collected and held such rents, was required
to turn the rents over to the trustee.142 However, the court found
134. Id.
135. 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966); see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
136. 92 Bankr. 461 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1988).
137. Id. at 463, 465.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 467.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 468. The bank also was required to pay interest to the debtor on the
sums withheld because the bank had improperly accepted and retained the post-peti-
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that rents collected after the sixty-day period of section 365(d)(4) are
not the property of the bankruptcy estate. 1 4 3
In support of its ruling that the effect of lease rejection is to termi-
nate the lease as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed, the
court again cited Southwest Aircraft.144 The court also cited section
365(g) and In re Lovitt.145 In Gillis, the court continually cites sec-
tion 365(g) as if it supports the court's view on the effect of lease re-
jection, notwithstanding that section 365(g) specifically states that
the rejection of an unexpired lease "constitutes a breach."'146 The
court's citation of Lovitt is also inconsistent because, as the court
points out in the same opinion, Lovitt was decided under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.14 7 The court stated:
The court in Lovitt held that, because rejection of an executory contract is
retroactive to the date the bankruptcy petition is filed, such a contract never
became a part of the estate. But this particular aspect of the Lovitt decision
cannot be treated as precedent in the present case since 11 U.S.C. § 541 pro-
vides that property of the estate includes all property in which debtor has an
interest. Lovitt was decided under the former bankruptcy Act, which limited
that which was considered property of the estate. The bankruptcy act has
been substantially amended under the Code.
14 8
For the same reasons, Lovitt does not support the court's holding
that the effect of rejection is to terminate the lease effective on the
date of the bankruptcy petition.
To support its holding that the bank's security interest was com-
pletely extinguished by rejection of the lease, the court stated "the
Bank cannot hold a security interest in property in which the debtor
has no interest,' 149 and quoted the following passage: "[A] mortgage
ceases to have consequence as an interest in land whenever the mort-
gagor's interest in the premises ends, as where a mortgagor-leasee
[sic] surrenders the leased premises to his landlord. 1 50 The court
also cited its own opinion in Bernard: "[A]llowing [the] leasehold
mortgage to exist after rejection of the lease would frustrate the pur-
pose of section 365(d)(4)."151
tion rents in violation of the automatic stay and had failed to seek relief from the stay.
Id. at .471.
143. Id. at 469.
144. Id. at 465.
145. 757 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1985); see Gillis, 92 Bankr. at 465.
146. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1988).
147. Gillis, 92 Bankr. at 466.
148. Id. (citing Lovitt, 757 F.2d at 1041).
149. Id. at 465.
150. Id. at 465-66 (quoting 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
461 (1987)).
151. Id. at 466 (citing In re Bernard, 69 Bankr. 13, 14-15 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986)).
Judge Chinen did not explain, either in Gillis or Bernard how the
continued existence of a leasehold mortgage would frustrate the pur-
pose of section 365, or which specific purpose would be frustrated. In
Gillis, Judge Chinen cited Ango Restaurant Corp. v. Sunrise Hotel
Corp.152 for the proposition that "where the leasehold is terminated,
[the] secured party with assignment of [the] lease is precluded from
asserting any right in [the] leasehold."153 Judge Chinen concluded
that "[u]pon the date that the [1]ease was effectively terminated, any
right, title or interest held by the Bank in the [1]ease was fully and
permanently extinguished."154 However, the Ango Restaurant deci-
sion involved a landlord who consented to an assignment of the lease
by the lessee and then attempted to collect money owed by the origi-
nal lessee from the lessee's assignee.155 In Gillis, the court never
pointed out that the security interest in Ango Restaurant is a security
interest held by the landlord, who had consented to the assignment.
In discussing its holding that under the Code a lease is part of the
estate at the time of filing, the Gillis court distinguished the Lovitt
decision and offered, as the sole support of its decision, a line of cases
holding that the debtor has no interest in rejected leases. In review-
ing the language, the court stated that "under the Bankruptcy Code,
as opposed to the prior Act, a lease becomes a part of the bankruptcy
estate at the time of filing, and need not be expressly assumed by the
trustee."'156 Without discussing conflicting case law or statutory lan-
guage, the court boldly (and revealingly) asserted: "Thus, for exam-
ple, the Bank is regarded as a general unsecured creditor since its
security interest is deemed to have evaporated at the time [the
debtor] filed [the] bankruptcy petition."'157
The Gills decision and its notion of evaporation of security inter-
ests give pause to jurists as well as secured creditors. In Gillis, the
court seems to have started with a desired result, and then, without
acknowledging the application of equity, indulged in an exercise of
justification instead of objective analysis. The result is that a provi-
sion intended by Congress to express a simple concept has been fur-
ther obscured.
J. Sea Harvest
A recent case by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals might be cited
for the proposition that rejection is tantamount to termination. In
152. 98 Misc. 2d 597, 414 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
153. Gillis, 92 Bankr. at 466.
154. Id.
155. Ango Restaurant, 98 Misc. 2d at 597-98, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 266-67.
156. Gillis, 92 Bankr. at 467 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. IV 1986)).
157, rd. at 468 (emphasis added).
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Sea Harvest Corp. v. Riviera Land Co.,158 a Chapter 11 debtor in pos-
session was the lessee of nonresidential property. The bankruptcy
court held that because the debtor in possession failed to properly as-
sume the lease, the lease was rejected. 159 The district court upheld
the bankruptcy court's decision.16 0 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
Judge Clifford Wallace noted that under section 365(d)(4), when a
lease is deemed rejected, the trustee or debtor in possession must
"'immediately surrender' the leased property to the lessor."161
Judge Wallace then held that the surrender of the leasehold had the
"effect of terminating the enterprise that operates there."162
The narrow holding in Sea Harvest does not clearly support either
the termination or breach positions concerning the leasehold security
interests for two reasons. First, the case did not involve a leasehold
security interest; and second, the court specifically held that "the en-
terprise that operates there," and not the lease, was terminated.163
K Austin
In In re Austin,164 the court considered a lessee-debtor's motion to
assume a lease which had been deemed rejected by operation of
law.165 The lease was not in default, 166 and the lessor "accepted
rental payments from the [lessee-debtor] from the time the [lessee-
debtor] filed for protection under Title 11 and for more than two
years after it had knowledge of the bankruptcy petitions."167 Citing
Giles as authority, the lessor sought to have the court deem the lease
rejected and thus the debtor's interest terminated. The court ac-
knowledged Giles168 and the cases holding that after the expiration
of the sixty-day period the lessee-debtor may not assume an
unexpired lease,169 but stated that "[b]inding precedent on this court
158. 868 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1989).
159. Id. at 1078.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1080 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (1988)).
162. Id. at 1080-81.
163. Id.
164. 102 Bankr. 897 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1989).
165. Id. at 898.
166. Id. at 901.
167. Id. at 900.
168. See supra notes 120-35 and accompanying text.
169. Austin, 102 Bankr. at 899-900; see In re Dial-A-Tire, Inc., 78 Bankr. 13 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. (1987) (holding that where the debtor was both lessee and sublessor of non-
residential real property and failed to assume the lease and sublease within 60 days of
filing, both the lease and sublease were deemed rejected, "leaving the bankruptcy es-
tate with no meaningful interest in the ultimate disposition of the Premises"); In re
has held that section 70(b) of the former Bankruptcy Act, which was
very similar to 365(d)(4), was designed for the benefit of the lessor
and could be waived by the lessor .... Section 365(d)(4) was also
designed for the benefit of the lessor and has the same effect as for-
mer section 70(b)."170 The court noted that "[t]he right of a lessor to
have a lease deemed rejected by operation of law may be waived
under appropriate circumstances, and the lessor may be estopped
from efforts to dispossess a lessee-debtor if a waiver has occurred."17 1
V. ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT FACTUAL SITUATIONS AND DRAFTING
CONSIDERATIONS FOR MORTGAGEES
Four categories of general factual situations exist in which lease re-
jection under section 365 could impact a security interest: (1) a les-
sor-mortgagor whose lessee files bankruptcy; (2) a lessor-mortgagor
who files bankruptcy; (3) a lessee-mortgagor whose lessor files bank-
ruptcy; and (4) a lessee-mortgagor who files bankruptcy. The effect
of lease rejection on each scenario is discussed below under either the
breach theory or the termination theory for determining the effect of
rejection. Key negotiation points and contractual clauses are also
suggested.
A. Lessor-Mortgagor, Lessee-Debtor
A lessor with a long-term tenant may borrow money secured by
the stream of income or rent. If the lessee files bankruptcy and re-
jects the lease, the mortgagee's security interest would be jeopard-
ized, whether the lease rejection is regarded as terminating the lease
or merely breaching the lease.
If the lease is regarded as terminated, the lessor-mortgagor would
be left without the stream of rent and the lessor's mortgagee would
be left without the stream of rent as security for its loan. The se-
cured party would be in a stronger position, of course, if it also has a
perfected security interest in the lessor's real property interest.
If lease rejection is merely a breach of the lease, the secured party
would be in a slightly better position because the secured party may
have a security interest in the damages for the breach under sections
365(g) and 502(g), particularly if the mortgagee has bargained for this
right. Language should be included in the loan documents and the
lease assigning to a leasehold mortgagee the damage claim of the les-
Las Margaritas, Inc., 54 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985) (holding that when a Chapter
11 lessee-debtor did not assume a nonresidential real property lease within 60 days of
filing, the lease was deemed rejected and the lessee-debtor had no right to assume it
later).
170. Austin, 102 Bankr. at 900 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 901.
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sor-mortgagor arising out of the rejection of the lease.172
B. Lessor-Mortgagor Who Files Bankruptcy
A lessor who has granted a security interest in the leasehold may
file bankruptcy and, by election, choose to reject that lease. 17 3
The courts that view rejection as terminating the leasehold pre-
sumably would rule that the leasehold under these facts "evaporates"
upon rejection.174 However, under section 365(h), the lessee still has
an option to remain in possession and pay rent at the contract rate.
In this scenario, the view that lease rejection is synonymous with ter-
mination or evaporation seems to make little sense. The lessee is still
in possession and, under section 365(h), is still required to make rent
172. See L. CHERKIS, COLLIER REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS AND THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE 2.01[5], at 2-19 (1989). Cherkis suggests the following language:
Mortgagor hereby unconditionally assigns, transfers and sets over to Mortga-
gee all of Mortgagor's claims and rights to the payment of damages arising
from any rejection by [lessee] of the lease under the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (the "Bankruptcy Code"). Mortgagee shall have the right
to proceed in its own name or in the name of Mortgagor in respect of any
claim, suit, action or proceeding relating to the rejection of the lease, includ-
ing, without limitation, the right to file and prosecute, to the exclusion of
Mortgagor, any proofs of claim, complaints, motions, applications, notices and
other documents, in any case in respect of [lessee] under the Bankruptcy
Code. This assignment constitutes a present, irrevocable and unconditional as-
signment of the foregoing claims, rights and remedies, and shall continue in
effect until all of the indebtedness and obligations secured by this mortgage
shall have been satisfied and discharged in full. Any amounts received by
Mortgagee as damages arising out of rejection of the lease as aforesaid shall be
applied first to all costs and expenses of Mortgagee (including, without limita-
tion, attorneys' fees) incurred in connection with the exercise of any of its
rights or remedies under this paragraph... and then in accordance with para-
graph... of this mortgage [application of proceeds clause].
Id.
173. A lessee-debtor cannot reject a nonresidential lease by inaction. Section
365(d)(1) provides that the trustee in a Chapter 7 case can reject an unexpired lease of
residential real property, but it does not make such a provision for nonresidential real
property. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1988). Section 365(d)(2) provides that a trustee or
debtor in possession in a case under Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 may reject an unexpired
lease for residential real property at any time before confirmation of a plan. Id.
§ 365(d)(2).
Section 365(d)(4) provides that the trustee under any chapter, or a debtor in posses-
sion under Chapter 11, must expressly assume or reject an unexpired lease of nonresi-
dential real property under which the debtor is the lessee within 60 days or such
additional time as the court fixes or the lease will be deemed rejected. Id. § 365(d)(4).
Based on the explicit language of section 365(d)(4), it would appear that a lease can
be rejected by inaction only if it is a nonresidential lease under which the debtor is the
lessee.
174. See In re Gillis, 92 Bankr. 461 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1988). For a discussion of Gil-
lis, see supra notes 136-57 and accompanying text.
payments to the lessor.175
Under this factual scenario, it makes more sense to regard the
lease as breached by the lessor who has rejected the lease. Section
365(a) provides that "the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
accept or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor" except as provided in section 365(d).176 If the lessee elects to
remain in possession and pay rent at the contract rate, it would be
particularly inequitable to deny the leasehold mortgagee the right to
the rent as security based on a unilateral act of the lessor in rejecting
the contract. 177
A mortgagee might deal with this situation in its contract by in-
cluding language which provides for (1) an assignment of the lessor's
right to reject under section 365(a); or (2) an assignment of the les-
sor's right to rents paid by the lessee as required under section
365(h); and/or (3) a clause setting a deadline for the lessor-debtor to
assume or reject.
While the enforceability of an agreement waiving the right to re-
ject the lease in a bankruptcy case would be doubtful, an agreement
granting the mortgagee the option to assume a lease in lieu of rejec-
tion by the trustee or debtor in possession may be enforceable. 178
A leasehold mortgagee can protect against the possibility that its
leasehold security will be considered "evaporated" by claiming a se-
curity interest in the lessee's post-rejection tenancy arising not from
the lease, but from the statutory "right of possession" created by sec-
175. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1), (2) (1988). For a discussion of section 365(h), see
supra notes 30-31, 43 and accompanying text.
176. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
177. Under similar facts, the court in In re LHD Realty Corp., 20 Bankr. 717
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982), treated the rejected lease as not terminating the leasehold es-
tate. Id. at 719; see also supra notes 40, 42 and accompanying text.
178. See L. CHERKIS, supra note 172, 2.01[7], at 2-28 to -29. The following language
grants the mortgagee the option to assume a lease in lieu of rejection of the lease by
the trustee:
If there shall be filed by or against the Mortgagor a petition under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (the "Bankruptcy Code"), and the Mortga-
gor, as [lessor] under the lease [defined], shall determine to reject the lease
pursuant to Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Mortgagor shall
give the Mortgagee not less than ten days' prior notice of the date on which
the Mortgagor shall apply to the bankruptcy court for authority to reject the
lease. The Mortgagee shall have the right, but not the obligation, to serve
upon the Mortgagor within such ten-day period a notice stating that (a) the
Mortgagee demands that the Mortgagor assume and assign the lease to the
Mortgagee pursuant to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code and (b) the Mort-
gagee covenants to cure or provide adequate assurance of future performance
under the lease. If the Mortgagee serves upon the Mortgagor the notice de-
scribed in the preceding sentence, the Mortgagor shall not seek to reject the
lease and shall comply with the demand provided for in clause (a) of the pre-
ceding sentence within 30 days after the notice shall have been given, subject
to the performance by the Mortgagee of the covenant provided for in clause
(b) of the preceding sentence.
Id. 2.01[7], at 2-29.
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tion 365(h)(1).179 The legislative history for the 1984 amendment,
which added section 365(h)(1), states that the amendment "enables a
sublessee or leasehold mortgagee to step in the position of the
debtor's lessee in the event the lessee seeks to treat the trustee's re-
jection as a termination. '"180 This statement of intent is consistent
with pre-Code cases which, even in the absence of protective lan-
guage in a leasehold mortgage, held that the leasehold mortgagee's
position would be protected against impairment by a rejecting lessor-
debtor and a lessee which elected to treat the lease as terminated.181
Section 365(d) does not place any time restriction for assumption or
rejection of a nonresidential lease by a lessor-debtor. A mortgagee
may be able to bargain for language in its loan and security document
requiring the lessor, in the event of bankruptcy, to assume or reject
the lease within a specified period.
C. Lessee-Mortgagor, Lessor Files Bankruptcy
A lessee may borrow money secured by a long-term lease. If the
lessor then files bankruptcy and rejects the lease, and the lessee
elects to treat the rejection as terminating the leasehold, the lease-
hold mortgagee would be allowed under the legislative history of sec-
tion 365(h)182 to step into the position of the debtor's lessee. This,
essentially, is what the courts allowed in In re Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. 1 S3 and In re Garfinkle.184 The congressional history
seems to recognize the inequity of treating the leasehold as termi-
nated and, therefore, suggests that the leasehold mortgagee should be
allowed to step in and assume. Based on the language of the legisla-
tive history, a clause requiring the lessee-mortgagor to obtain the
leasehold mortgagee's consent before electing to treat the lease as
terminated should be enforceable.185 The leasehold mortgagee might
179. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (1988). Cherkis suggests the following clause for this pur-
pose: "Mortgagor shall not without Mortgagee's prior written consent elect to treat
the lease as terminated under Section 365(h)(1) of' the Bankruptcy Code, U.S.C.
§ 365(h)(1). Any such election made without Mortgagee's prior written consent shill
be void." L. CHERKIS, supra note 172, 1 2.01[5], at 2-18.
180. S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1983).
181. See, e.g., In re Garfinkle, 577 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see also supra notes 51-64.
182. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
183. 458 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
184. 577 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of Garfinkle, see supra notes 51-
64 and accompanying text.
185. See L. Ci.gP KIS ;vipr,, 13te 172, 2.01[5], at 2-18. For the text of the clause
suggested by Cherkis for t ...s jurpose, see supra note 179.
also consider inclusion of language in an attornment agreement with
the lessor which would protect the leasehold mortgagee by specifi-
cally allowing the leasehold mortgagee to assume the lease.18 6
D. Lessee-Mortgagor, Lessee-Debtor
This factual scenario is potentially the most precarious for a lease-
hold mortgagee because, under section 365(d), a nonresidential lease
could be rejected by the tnaction of the debtor in possession or
trustee. 8 7 A leasehold mortgagee, therefore, should include lan-
guage in documents requiring immediate notice of any bankruptcy so
that the leasehold mortgagee will be in a position to take quick ac-
tion, if necessary. 8 8
If the lessee-mortgagor debtor in this scenario rejects the lease, and
the court interprets the effect of rejection to be termination or "evap-
oration" of the leasehold, the leasehold mortgagee would be com-
pletely deprived of its security. This occurred in Hawaii
Dimensions,189 Giles,19° Gillis,191 and Bernard.192
If the court treats rejection as a breach, the leasehold mortgagee
would have the right, to the extent provided for by contract and al-
lowed under state law, to retake the leasehold premises, pay the les-
sor, and sublease or sell the lease in order to obtain payment of his
debt. The latter interpretation is the most equitable since it protects
the leasehold mortgagee from the legal abhorrence of a forfeiture. 193
It is also consistent with the apparent recognition in the legislative
history for section 365(h) of the need to protect leasehold
mortgagees.194
Leasehold mortgagees in this factual scenario could protect their
interests by including a provision granting the leasehold mortgagee
186. A lessor might agree to the language only if the leasehold mortgagee agreed to
assume the lease at market rent rather than at the contract rent, which may not be
palatable to the leasehold mortgagee.
187. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
188. This language could protect against situations in which creditors lose assets
from the bankruptcy estate without realizing it. See In re Kelly Lyn Franchise Co., 26
Bankr. 441, 447 n.9 (Bankr.), aff'd, 33 Bankr. 112 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); see also Andrew,
supra note 12, at 880 n.143.
189. For a discussion of the Hawaii Dimensions case, see supra notes 65-78 and ac-
companying text.
190. For a discussion of the Giles case, see supra notes 120-34 and. accompanying
text.
191. For a discussion of the Gillis case, see supra notes 136-57 and accompanying
text.
192. For a discussion of the Bernard case, see supra notes 107-15 and accompanying
text.
193. See Annotation, Commercial Leases: Application of Rule that Lease May be
Cancelled Only for "Material" Breach, 54 A.L.R. 4TH 595, 606 (1987).
194. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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an option to assume the lease in lieu of rejection by the trustee.195 A
leasehold mortgagee also might consider the inclusion of language
signaling the court that the rights of the leasehold mortgagee should
be considered in the context of lease rejection.196 Leasehold mortga-
gees could further protect their interests from the ambiguity of judi-
cial interpretation of section 365(g) by including language to the
effect that rejection by the lessee's trustee will not terminate the
lease if the leasehold mortgagee assumes the lease and cures the out-
standing defaults thereunder.19 7 In the absence of such a provision in
195. See L. CHERKIS, supra note 172, 2.01[7], at 2-28 to -29. The following language
grants the mortgagee the option to assume a lease in lieu of rejection of the lease by
the trustee:
If there shall be filed by or against the Mortgagor a petition under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (the "Bankruptcy Code"), and the Mortga-
gor, as lessee under the lease [defined], shall determine to reject the lease
pursuant to Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Mortgagor shall
give the Mortgagee not less than ten days' prior notice of the date on which
the Mortgagor shall apply to the bankruptcy court for the authority to reject
the lease. The Mortgagee shall have the right, but not the obligation, to serve
upon the Mortgagor within such ten-day period a notice stating that (a) the
Mortgagee demands that the Mortgagor assume and assign the lease to the
Mortgagee pursuant to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code and (b) the Mort-
gagee covenants to cure or provide adequate assurance of future performance
under the lease. If the Mortgagee serves upon the Mortgagor the notice de-
scribed in the preceding sentence, the Mortgagor shall not seek to reject the
lease and shall comply with the demand provided for in clause (a) of the pre-
ceding sentence within 30 days after the notice shall have been given, subject
to the performance by the Mortgagee of the covenant provided for in clause
(b) of the preceding sentence.
Id. 2.01[7], at 2-29.
196. Cherkis suggests the following language:
Effective upon the entry of an order for relief in respect of the Mortgagor
under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (the "Bankruptcy Code"),
the Mortgagor hereby assigns and transfers to the Mortgagee a non-exclusive
right to apply to the Bankruptcy Court under Section 365(d)(4) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code for an order extending the period during which the lease [de-
fined] may be rejected or assumed.
Id. 1 2.01[8], at 2-30.
197. The following language is representative of the provisions providing that rejec-
tion will not terminate the lease if the mortgagee assumes the lease, and providing fur-
ther for reassignment of the lease by the leasehold mortgagee to a new party:
If the lessee shall reject this lease pursuant to Section 365(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), the lessor shall serve on the holder of the
then existing leasehold mortgage -written notice of such rejection, together
with a statement of all sums at the time due under this lease (without giving
effect to any acceleration), and of all other defaults under this lease then
known to the lessor. The holder of the leasehold mortgage shall have the
right, but not the obligation to serve on the lessor within ten days after ser-
vice of the notice provided for in the preceding sentence, a notice that the
leasehold mortgagee elects to (a) assume this lease and (b) cure all defaults
outstanding thereunder (x) concurrently with such assumption as to defaults
in the payment of money, and (y) within sixty days after the date of such as-
the lease, the leasehold mortgagee or collateral assignee has no
standing under the lease or the Bankruptcy Code to cure lease de-
faults and to compel an actual assignment.198
Finally, as an alternative to, or in conjunction with, the language
providing for the right of the leasehold mortgagee to assume the
lease, security documents could include language providing that the
lessor will enter into a new lease with the mortgagee upon rejection
and satisfaction of certain conditions. As noted by one commentator,
the disadvantage of such a clause would be the possibility that the
mortgagee would be required to subordinate to other liens.199
VI. CONCLUSION
The language of section 365 is subject to different interpretations
on the effect of lease rejection-especially on leasehold mortgagees.
Indeed, the few reported cases interpreting the effect of lease rejec-
tion on security interests in nonresidential real property reflect a
sharp division.
Two lines of cases exist with respect to rejection by a lessee-debtor:
one line holding that rejection constitutes termination of the lease
and all rights associated therewith,200 and the other holding that re-
jection constitutes a breach which does not result in complete termi-
nation of the lease for all purposes.201 The complete termination line
sumption as to other defaults except defaults of the type specified in Section
365(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2). If such holder of the
leasehold mortgage serves the notice provided for in the preceding sentence,
then, as between the lessor and such leasehold mortgagee (1) the rejection of
the lease by the lessee shall not constitute a termination of this lease, (2) the
leasehold mortgagee may assume the obligations of the lessee under this lease
without any instrument or assignment or assignment from the lessee, (3) the
leasehold mortgagee's rights under this lease shall be free and clear of all
rights, claims and encumbrances of or in respect of the lessee, and (4) the
leasehold mortgagee shall consummate the assumption of the lease and the
payment of the amounts payable by it to the lessor pursuant to this section at
closing to be held at the offices of the lessor at the address set forth at the
head of this lease [insert other closing mechanism as desired] on the . . . busi-
ness day after the leasehold mortgagee shall have served the notice herein-
above provided for. Upon an assignment of this lease by the leasehold
mortgagee, the leasehold mortgagee shall be relieved of all obligations and lia-
bilities arising from and after the date of such assignment.
Id. 2.01[8], at 2-31.
198. See In re Cobham Enter., Inc., 62 Bankr. 191, 194-95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
199. L. CHERKIS, supra note 172, 2.02[1], at 2-32 (citing Levitan, Leasehold Mort-
gage Financing: Reliance on the "New Lease" Provision, 15 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 413 (1980)).
200. See In re Giles Assocs., 92 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988); In re Gillis, 92
Bankr. 461 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1988); In re Bernard, 69 Bankr. 13 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986);
In re Southwest Aircraft Services, 53 Bankr. 805 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 66
Bankr. 121 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 831 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Hawaii
Dimensions, 39 Bankr. 606 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984), affl'd, 47 Bankr. 425 (D. Haw. 1985).
201. In re Miller, 103 Bankr. 353 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1989); In re Austin, 102 Bankr. 897
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1989); In re Blackburn, 88 Bankr. 273 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988); In re
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is based on the last clause of section 365(d)(4), which states that upon
rejection by the lessee-debtor, "the trustee shall immediately surren-
der such nonresidential real property to the lessor."202 The courts in
this line equate rejection and the surrender of possession with com-
plete termination of the lease.
On the other hand, the line of cases holding that rejection is a
breach which is not equivalent to complete termination for all pur-
poses is based on the fact that Congress, by using the terms rejection,
breach, and termination in different parts of the Code, presumably
knew the difference between the terms. These courts do not dispute
that a lessee-debtor who rejects a lease must surrender possession to
the lessor, but they generally are concerned with the continued appli-
cation of other terms of the rejected lease. In all cases, equity should
be acknowledged as an important consideration.
Ironically, the trial courts on both sides of the issue claim that the
statutory language is clear. The only decision stating that the statu-
tory language is not clear is the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Southwest Aircraft, which did not even specifically deal
with the issue.20 3
The conflict between the cases on this issue cannot be resolved by
resort to mechanical statutory interpretation. As suggested by Jus-
tice Douglas, 20 4 few statutes applied in a mechanical fashion will
yield uniform and equitable results. Michael Andrew's cogent com-
mentary was correct in stating that a strikingly simple concept has
been lost in confusion. 2O The cause of the confusion is twofold: (1)
the wording of section 365 is unclear, and (2) the statute has, all too
often, been mechanically applied to reach equitable results without
acknowledging the equitable principles upon which the statute was
based. Just as the conflict between the cases can be understood by
understanding and acknowledging the role of equity, the resolution
of the conflict is soluble by understanding, as suggested by Mr. An-
drew, that rejection does not affect contract liabilities; rather, rejec-
tion or assumption merely refers to the trustee's election to assume
CM Systems, 86 Bankr. 707 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); Societe Nationale Algerienne
Pour La Recherche v. Distrigas Corp., 80 Bankr. 606 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); In re Pic-
nic 'N Chicken, 58 Bankr. 523 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986); In re Storage Technology Corp.,
53 Bankr. 471 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
202. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (1988).
203. See Southwest Aircrqft, 831 F.2d at 849-50.
204. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
205. Andrew, supra note 12, at 848.
or not to assume the contract.20 6
Considerable support exists for Mr. Andrew's view. David Epstein
discussed the "Andrew approach" to rejection in a recent article on
executory contracts and leases.20 7 Judge S. Martin Teel of the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia also
considered this approach to rejection and stated "upon rejection and
resulting breach, the lease may no longer be an asset of the estate,
but the lease itself is essentially undistributed, remaining intact with
all of its benefits and burdens outside of bankruptcy."20 8
The Supreme Court, for its part, has not always led the way in re-
viving the plain meaning rule for interpretation of statutes. The
Court followed the plain statutory language in ruling on an un-
secured creditor's right to adequate protection,2 09 but chose a differ-
ent tack in ruling on rejection of collective bargaining agreements.210
The Supreme Court should lead the way in interpretation of statutes
based upon their plain meaning. When the plain meaning is not
clear, either on the face of the statute or by resort to legislative his-
tory, courts should strive to ensure that legitimate process is pre-
served by acknowledging the role of equity in sound legal reasoning,
rather than obscuring result-oriented reasoning with a cloak of logic
and disciplined analysis. It is important for courts to lead the way in
preserving intellectual honesty and legitimate process if the courts
are to maintain the respect of society as the ultimate forum for reso-
lution of disputes.211
The Bankruptcy Code has provisions to protect lessees and lessors
from the inequitable results of lease rejection. 212 Correctly inter-
preted, the simple definition of lease rejection, as intended by the
drafters, also would protect mortgagees. If the present conflicting de-
cisions on the issue cannot be resolved by following what now ap-
pears to be an emerging majority position, Congress should amend
the Code to protect mortgagees by clearly defining the effect of lease
rejection on security interests in leases.
206. Id.
207. See generally Epstein, supra note 9.
208. In re Miller, 103 Bankr. 353, 355 (Bankr. D.C. 1989).
209. United Savings Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 108 S. Ct.
626, 634-35 (1988).
210. NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
211. See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 261-64 (1990).
212. The Bankruptcy Code also contains "separate statutory provisions for land-
lords, shopping centers ... commodities, aircraft leasing, collective bargaining, rei-
tiree's [sic] benefits, timesharing . . . intstallment [sic] and sales contracts" and
licensees of intellectual property. Epstein, supra note 9, at 147.
